AIADMK scrapes through with just one per cent margin

Chennai: The ruling AIADMK has scraped through in the Assembly elections with the narrowest of margins, just about 1 per cent. The AIADMK front secured 40.8 per cent, just one per cent ahead of the DMK alliance vote percentage of 39.7. If the AIADMK had not taken in minor allies who were allotted seven seats, the DMK front could have overtaken the AIADMK in terms of vote percentage and also number of seats.

The AIADMK has got the better of DMK by a hair's breath. The media tries to project the AIADMK performance as spectacular and unprecedented. Similarly, the DMK performance is also not spectacular and unprecedented. The truth is that the AIADMK, which got 51.9 per cent with the help of allies in 2011, had dropped these partners who had enjoyed the support of over 12 per cent (DMDK, CPI, CPM, MMK, PT). This reduced the AIADMK stength to 40.8, about the same as in 2011.       

The DMK too hasn't achieved anything beyond its 2011 performance. The DMK front has bagged 39.7 per cent of the votes in 2016, which is almost the same as 39.5 per cent in 2011,    

However, the diference is that the AIADMK front has lost a large number of seats from 203 in 2011 to reach 134 now. This is mainly due to the loss of 12 per cent support from allies. Had the AIADMK taken in a few more allies, it could have got at least 45 per cent of the popular vote and ensured a seat share of close to 180 seats.

The failure of the AIADMK to bring on board some allies like the Vaazhvurimai Katchi led by Velmurugan, TMC led by G K Vasan, MMK and Puthiya Tamizhagam etc  
has given a windfall gain for the DMK front from just 31 seats to 98 now. The AIADMK has nobody but itself to blame for allowing such a huge number for the DMK in the new House. The presence of a few allies would have limited the DMK front to around 25 seats as in 2011.

The absence of some allies in the AIADMK camp meant that the two fronts were level and in a dead heat situation. The AIADMK had taken a huge risk and almost handed over a majority on a platter to the DMK.

Luck and providence has been on the side of the AIADMK.

The second important fact that emerges from an analysis of the 2016 polls is that the AIADMK has been affected by an anti-incumbency factor (as seen from the DMK front grabbing 98 seats) but it has received a gain of at least five to 6 per cent votes from people who might have voted for the Third Front but resorted to strategic or tactical voting to cast these votes to the AIADMK and prevent a DMK victory. The Third Front had a strength of 20 per cent. The actual votes realised were only 6.1 per cent. Where did these 14 per cent votes go? The persons who wanted to vote for the Third Front did not want to vote for the DMK, while at the same time they felt that there was no point in wasting their votes for the Third Front as opinion polls said the front would lose badly. The transfer of these votes helped the AIADMK neutralise the effect of the loss due to anti-incumbency factor.

The DMK front too lost some allies of 2011 in the form of PMK and VCK and with Congress vote share also declining, the DMK front vote-share could have dropped from 39.5 to about 28 per cent. However it is clear, that over 10 per cent of votes, which would otherwise have gone to the Third Front had migrated to the DMK alliance, raising it from 28 to 39.7 per cent. Thus, about 10 per cent of votes had moved from the Third Front to the DMK front, and another 5 to 6 per cent to the AIADMK front.

The PMK and BJP had secured more or less the same percentage as in 2011. Therefore, it is obvious that the increase for both the AIADMK and DMK combines has come from the Third Front. This also explains why the Third Front did not secure a 20 per cent vote share as expected and fell to just 6.1 per cent.     

By R. Rangaraj